Water Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 1

Article 14

9-1-2010

Lake CDA Inv., LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Lands, 233 P.3d 721 (Idaho
2010)
Nicole Tachibana

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Nicole Tachibana, Court Report, Lake CDA Inv., LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Lands, 233 P.3d 721 (Idaho 2010), 14
U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 181 (2010).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue 1I

COURT REPORTS
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court found no grounds to invoke equitable estoppel.
John Bartholomew

IDAHO
Lake CDA Inv., LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Lands, 233 P.3d 721
(Idaho 2010) (holding that the state's highway easements extended to
a lake's ordinary high water mark and, subsequently, did not
terminate the landowner's littoral rights; the fill the state added to the
lake was part of the public land trust but also did not eliminate littoral
rights; and the landowner's did not need to apply for highway
encroachment permits for proposed docks that would rest on the
public land trust fill).
In 2006, Lake CDA Investments . and Chris Keenan
("Landowners") applied for dock permits for separate properties
located on Lake Coeur d'Alene with the Idaho Department of Lands
("Land Board") and the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD").
On March 30, 2007, the Land Board held an administrative hearing,
combining the Landowners' applications.
At the hearing, an ITD surveyor testified that the Landowners'
predecessor in interest deeded a 1940 highway easement ("1940
easement") to the State of Idaho. The surveyor further testified that
this easement extended out into the lake and, therefore, made the
The
Landowners' riparian rights subordinate to the easement.
hearing officer recommended the Land Board reject the applications,
finding that the Landowners' littoral rights were subordinate to the
1940 easement. The hearing officer reasoned that without littoral
rights the Landowners were not qualified to apply for the dock
permits. The Land Board subsequently rejected the Landowners'
applications based on the hearing officer's recommendations.
The Landowners then appealed to the Idaho District Court. The
district court vacated the Land Board's decision, ruling that the 1940
easement did not affect the Landowners' littoral rights because the
easement only extended down to the ordinary high water mark. In
addition, the district court awarded the Landowners attorneys' fees
and costs of $23,128.51.
The Land Board and ITD then appealed to the Supreme Court of
Idaho ("court"). The Land Board and ITD argued that the first issue,
whether the 1940 easement extinguished the Landowners' littoral
rights, was analogous to the court's rulings on railroad easements,
However, the court
which required exclusive easements.
distinguished railroad easements from highway easements, reasoning
that the state holds highways in trust for public use, and thus,
highways do not require exclusive easements. Furthermore, the court
ruled that the 1940 easement did not grant an easement over the
disputed area because the Landowners, as littoral owners,. only took
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title of the property down to the ordinary high water mark. The state
reserves the property below the ordinary high water mark in trust for
the public's use and benefit. Therefore, because the state did not
have an exclusive easement over the disputed area, the Landowners
could exercise their littoral rights and apply for dock permits.
The ITD further argued that the state added fill to the lakebed to
widen and straighten the highway, and the fill, in turn, stayed as
public trust land. The court agreed with ITD but held that while the
fill does stay as public land trust, the fill does not eliminate the
Landowners' littoral rights because, otherwise, the Landowners would
have to cross the fill to exercise their basic littoral rights.
Accordingly, the court found that the existence of the public land
trust did not exclude the Landowners' littoral rights.
Next, ITD argued that the Landowners were required to apply for
highway encroachment permits with ITD before they could request
dock permits. The court found that the Landowners did not need
highway encroachment permits because the proposed docks would
rest on the fill, which, as discussed above, rests on the public land
trust and is not part of the highway right-of-way. Therefore, the court
held that it would be inappropriate for the Landowners to apply for
highway encroachment permits for the public land trust.
Finally, the court reversed the district court's award of attorneys'
fees and costs, ruling that the Land Board and IDT had a reasonable
basis in fact or law for arguing against the Landowners' action.
In summary, the court affirmed the district court, finding that
highway easements do not terminate the Landowners' littoral rights
because the easement extends only to a lake's ordinary high water
mark. The court further found that the state's actions of adding fill to
the lake does not eliminate the Landowners' littoral rights because
the added fill stays in the public trust, and the Landowners' are not
required to apply for highway encroachment permits for proposed
docks that would rest on the public land trust fill.
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